Van+de+Mark

BRIAN VANDEMARK: //**INTO THE QUAGMIRE: LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE ESCALATION OF THE VIETNAM WAR**//

We are going to read the VanDeMark book very closely. It provides an extended case study of the decision to escalate America's role in Vietnam.

To make our reading and discussion more personal, I would like each of us to follow a specific person or persons throughout the entire narrative. I will follow all of them. You should choose from one of the following headings. 1) President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) 2) Secretary of Defense: Robert McNamara, Clark Clifford (plus earlier role as advisor) 3) Secretary of State: Dean Rusk 4) Military Leaders: Maxwell Taylor, William Westmoreland, and Earle Wheeler 5) Presidential Advisors: McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, John McNaughton 6) Devil's Advocate: George Ball 7) Those who gave advice to LBJ: Senators Richard Russell and Mike Mansfield, ex-President Dwight D. Eisenhower

Time frame of book: November 1964 to July 1965 Two major decisions: bombing of North Vietnam and sending U.S. troops Context in which decision makers acted Immense complexities and tensions
 * Preface**

Interplay: longstanding ideological attitudes, diplomatic assumptions, political pressures, contemporary events in America and Vietnam America as the defender of "monolithic" communist expansion Stability in the south "prior to" escalation versus stability "through" escalation Rational men struggled to control irrational forces Was Saigon viable as a political entity?
 * Introduction**

4-8 cumulative legacy of three administrations: containment; events in China, NSC-68; Korean War; domino principle; wars of national liberation; flexible response 8-9 LBJ's background and world view 11 Dean Rusk 12 Robert McNamara 13 McGeorge Bundy 14-15 Coup against Diem unleashed centrifugal forces 16 PLAN 34A 16-17 William Westmoreland 17 Maxwell Taylor; Tonkin Gulf actions 18 Tonkin Gulf Resolution 20-21 Events in South Vietnam: Catholics v. Buddhists; Army v. civilians
 * Chapter 1: The Crossroads in Vietnam**

23 NSC Working Group Three recent events influenced administration 24 Ouster of Nikita Khrushchev 24-25 U.S. fear of PRC: now a member of nuclear club 25-26 Bienhoa 26 Working Group: William Bundy 27 Working Group: Vice Admiral Lloyd Mustin; John McNaughton 28 Three Options; Good Doctor 29 Conservatives: heavier bombing Liberals: end the bombing Heavy Democratic majorities in both houses of Congress 30 LBJ's hurry to get his Great Society legislation passed 31 Goldilocks Principle Devil's Advocate: George Ball 32 Rusk's hard line: withdrawal unthinkable LBJ solicits advice of old friends: Senator Richard Russell 34 Ambassador Maxwell Taylor arrives for meetings: his views 37 U.S. moves closer to decision to bomb North to strengthen South
 * Chapter 2: The Day of Reckoning is Coming**

39 LBJ obsession against leaks 39-41 LBJ solicits advice of old friends: Senator Mike Mansfield How candid should LBJ be with American people about "war" 42-46 Events in South Vietnam continue to affect decision making 46 LBJ discusses war: Walter Lippmann 47 LBJ fear of conservative backlash Joseph Alsop 49 Bill Hosokawa's letter: pay close attention to his insights 50 Brinks Hotel bombing LBJ critics call for tough action: bombing or troops???? 51 Ambassador Taylor: interesting role as a former soldier, now diplomat 52 Paragraph beginning with "Here was the nub of America's dilemma" 53 George Ball's advice: follow this man closely throughout the book Escalation can be a two-way street 54 State of Union address focused on LBJ's real interest: Great Society 55 Bipartisanship in foreign policy: what if Republicans had gone along 59 Stability in South through escalation: bombing would resuscitate South 60 Bombing would inoculate against conservative threat
 * Chapter 3: Stable Government or No Stable Government**

61 Utility of U.S. officials observation trips to South Vietnam 62-63 Pleiku: our book's rationale v. what we know from McNamara's book 64 How to play your hand in meetings with the boss: Ball, Mansfield 65 Bundy's report; Johnson's reaction 66 If South did not want to prevent communist domination, why did we care? 67 Possibility of significant air losses: why bomb? 69 LBJ conned the American people: "continuity" 71-72 How did Ball change his approach? LBJ's reaction [contrast with his reaction on page 90] 73-75 Vice President Humphrey puts in his two cents; threat from liberals 75 McGeorge Bundy wants to make LBJ decide [Bundy's way] 76 Notice how Bundy and McNamara work in concert Public opinions polls back air strikes Influence of Bill Moyers 77-78 LBJ solicits advice: Former President Eisenhower (Ike) What is your reaction to the advice Ike gives here [and later] 79 New troubles in South Vietnam postpone decision to bomb North 80-81 Pham Ngoc Thao: my meeting with him when I was a college student 83-84 Influence on LBJ of memo from Dean Rusk 84-90 Influence of memo from George Ball Important experience in Ball's past 90 Compare reaction of LBJ this time to that on page 72
 * Chapter 4: A Bear By The Tail**

92-93 Westmoreland requests ground troops to protect air bases Military will now gain power in discussions and decisions 95 LBJ's advisors refine their positions in light of new data 96-97 Selma events compounded Johnson's political calculations 98 Bundy and Westmoreland argue for more troops 99 LBJ once again ask Senator Mansfield for advice 101 Bundy's memo: many different pressures on LBJ 102 How could we have gotten our messages to Hanoi [McNamara's book] 104 LBJ again talks to Mansfield 105 CIA gloomy assessment 106 Taylor continues to challenge troop requests 107 LBJ not exactly truthful to the press 108 Could Vietcong win even if Hanoi supplies cut off 109 Change Marine's goal to active combat: mission creep 110 LBJ tries to deflect criticism: Fulbright 113 NSAM-328: inching ahead; secrecy
 * Chapter 5: Where Are We Going?**

115 What is "rational" Misperceptions of the enemy UN Secretary-General U Thant complicates the situation 117 Deciphering North's conflicting signals [and vice versa: McNamara book] 118-119 Other critics come on stream 120 Beginnings of anti-war movement: teach-ins 122 What threat from PRC—in middle of "Cultural Revolution" 123 LBJ never understood Ho Chi Minh 125-127 Altered complexion of decisions: military now more prominent Attempts to get Ambassador Taylor "on the team" 128-130 Ball writes another memo 131 LBJ decides to send 50,000 more troops
 * Chapter 6: If I Were Ho Chi Minh, I Would Never Negotiate**

132-134 Impact of Dominican Republic invasion on LBJ's political position 135 Pressures on LBJ from left and right 136 LBJ fears conservative criticism if he halts bombing 137 How to communicate with the North Vietnamese 138 McNamara's book calls this third point shift a "lost opportunity" 139 LBJ again talks to Ike 142 North sees American position as unfair to them: asymmetrical 143-144 LBJ gets advice from Clark Clifford 151-152 Taylor gets on the team; LBJ crashes a meeting
 * Chapter 7: What in the World is Happening**

153 Westmoreland again asks for more troops 155 Obscure means to confirm mission change 157 LBJ asks Mansfield for advice 159-160 Go through the give-and-take carefully 162 Conflicting pressures on LBJ 163 LBJ asks Ike for advice again 164-166 Another memo from George Ball 167 McNamara's position leans toward more troops; competing memos 168 Bundy questions ultimate objectives; but no withdrawal contemplated Ball calls for withdrawal 171 Rusk writes LBJ: hold to a hard line; stay the course in Vietnam 172 LBJ talks with Ike again; Ike continues to give hawkish advice 173-176 LBJ convenes the "elder statesmen"; they are hawkish [now] 180-181 How to finance the war [quietly]: guns versus butter
 * Chapter 8: Can You Stop It?**

184-192 This is a fascinating chronicle of a high-level meeting 192 LBJ tries to co-opt the Joint Chiefs [who are they?] 197 LBJ is very insightful here on how history will look his decisions 202 Ball's interaction with Clark Clifford 202-206 LBJ talks with Clark Clifford; pits Clifford against McNamara 206 LBJ made the decision to increase ground troop levels How to announce it publicly 207 No declaration of war; no reserve call up; no major departure 208-210 LBJ tries to co-opt Congressional leaders Senator Mansfield speaks up 212-214 Read these pages carefully
 * Chapter 9: Better'n Owl**

215-221 Read these pages carefully
 * Conclusion:**